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TRADITION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE
CATHOLIC CHURCH'S TEACHING ON
MARRIAGE: A RESPONSE TO
CARDINAL TRUJILLO
John J. Coughlin, O.F.M t
During the twentieth century, the teaching of the Roman Catholic
Church on the nature of marriage remained fully faithful to ancient
tradition and witnessed new developments. In his article, The Nature
of Marriage and Its Various Aspects, Alfonso Cardinal L6pez Trujillo
has afforded a splendid overview of both the timeless and adaptive
features of the Church's teaching.1 In commenting on the article, I
have been asked to identify obstacles to the article's reception as well
as to suggest possible resolutions. My brief response to His
Eminence, Cardinal Trujillo, consists of two parts. First, I suggest that
an epistemological issue is raised by the Church's insistence that
marriage continues to constitute an objective social reality in the face
of modem trends in favor of the subjectivity of marriage. Second, I
will discuss the "personalist" perspective on marriage as a twentieth-
century development in the Church's teaching, which represents an
adaptation to subjectivity even as it naintains the objective tradition.
My commentary focuses on Cardinal Trujillo's appeal to the natural
law. Natural law holds that traditional marriage consists of one man
and one woman who are united in an exclusive fidelity and a
permanent bond.2
t Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame; J.C.D., J.C.L., Pontifical Gregorian
University; J.D., Harvard Law School; Th.M., Princeton Theological Seminary; M.A., Columbia
University; B.A., Niagara University.
1. Alfonso Cardinal L6pez Trujillo, The Nature of Marriage and Its Various Aspects, 4
AVE MARIA L. REV. 297 (2006).
2. The Church's teaching also encompasses a theological tradition that holds marriage
between Christians to be a sacrament. As Cardinal Trujillo indicates, the natural law and
theological foundations of marriage are complementary in the Church's teaching. See id. at 298
("Marriage is a natural institution which precedes the sacrament.").
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I. MARRIAGE AS AN OBJECTIVE SOCIAL REALITY
One of the most fundamental obstacles to the reception of the
Church's teaching on marriage is an epistemological one. Toward the
beginning of his article, Cardinal Trujillo observes that "[miarriage is
not a kind of 'Christian property' but a patrimony of humanity that
affects believers and non-believers. Marriage involves man in his
human reality."3 In keeping with this observation, his article affirms
the natural law approach to marriage. Natural law posits that
marriage is a fundamental community that is necessary to the good of
individuals and society as a whole.4 For the individual, natural law
holds that marriage constitutes a most basic form of human
participation and solidarity. It represents the profound justification
for the expression of sexual intimacy between a man and a woman. It
affords the stable form of life in which children learn of human love
and trust from their parents.' Socially, marriage is understood as the
basic building block for culture and civilization. As an objective
social reality, the family unit formed around marriage remains an
essential element of the common good. A society's health depends
directly upon the health of marriage and the family.6 From the
perspective of natural law, the fundamental community of marriage
and the family constitute an objective social reality.7 Critical of legal
positivism, Cardinal Trujillo recognizes that the natural law approach
to marriage conflicts with the epistemological assumptions of
mainstream legal theory.8 At the outset, it seems important to
contextualize the discussion by acknowledging that the natural law
approach to marriage and family represents an understanding of law
that is not necessarily widely held in contemporary jurisprudence.
St. Thomas Aquinas defined law as an "ordinance of reason for
the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and
3. Id. at 301.
4. See Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae [Encyclical Letter on the Regulation of Birth] U 23
(St. Paul ed. 1968); Pope Pius XI, Casti Connubii [Encyclical Letter on Christian Marriage] 9J 121
(St. Paul ed. 2001) (1930) [hereinafter Casti Connubii].
5. See, e.g., KAROL WOJTYLA [POPE JOHN PAUL I], LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY 125-40 (H.T.
Willetts trans., Ignatius Press 1993) (1960).
6. See CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD, at xxiii-xxiv (W.W. Norton &
Co. 1995) (1977).
7. See Pope Paul VI, The Nature of the Marriage Bond, Address to the Roman Rota (Feb.
9, 1976), in PAPAL ALLOCUTIONS TO THE ROMAN ROTA: 1939-2002, at 133, 135-36 (William H.
Woestman, O.M.I. ed., 2002); Pope John Paul II, One Cannot Give In to the Divorce Mentality,
Address to the Roman Rota (Jan. 28, 2002), in PAPAL ALLOCUTIONS TO THE ROMAN ROTA: 1939-
2002, supra, at 267, 271.
8. See Trujillo, supra note 1, at 309.
[Vol. 4:2
Summer 2006] TRADITIONANDDEVELOPMENT
promulgated."9  According to the definition, law must be first and
foremost an "ordinance of reason." This requirement raises an
epistemological question. In other words, if reason is a primary
measure of law, one might ask: "What counts as reason?" For St.
Thomas, there is a close relation between law and "practical reason. " "
Practical reason identifies and applies reason for choice." It would be
incomplete to describe practical reason as a merely cognitive and
abstract mental function of the intellect. Rather, practical reason relies
on the harmony of the somatic, emotional, and higher cognitive
functions in the human person." Practical reason functions to
recognize basic human goods, intermediate moral principles derived
from the basic goods, and specific rules deduced from the
intermediate principles.13 Natural law theorists have long held that
practical reason reveals marriage as a basic human good, and that
practical reason is able to translate the basic good of marriage into
positive law.14 The Thomistic position reflects an epistemological
9. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Pt. I-II, Q. 90, Art. 4 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981) (1911) [hereinafter SUMMA THEOLOGICA]. In
the original Latin: "quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam
communitatishabet, promulgata." THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, Pt. I-I, Q. 90, Art. 4.
10. St. Thomas drew a specific distinction between the practical and speculative intellects.
See SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 9, Pt. I, Q. 79, Art. 11 ("[TIhe speculative and practical
intellects differ. For it is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends.. . while the
practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation.").
11. See JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 101 (1980) (describing "practical
reasonableness").
12. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 104 (1999) ("Right reason is reason
unfettered by emotional or other impediments to choosing consistently with what reason fully
requires."); LADISLAS ORSY, S.J., THEOLOGY AND CANON LAW: NEW HORIZONS FOR LEGISLATION
AND INTERPRETATION 176-77 (1992) (discussing the Thomistic definition as meaning an ordinance
of practical right reason).
13. See GEORGE, supra note 12, at 102 (identifying the three sets of principles of which
natural law consists).
14. St. Thomas suggests two ways by which the legislator uses practical intellect to
translate the transcendent principles of natural law into historically specific rules of positive law.
First, the legislator could reach a direct conclusion from premises. See SUMMA THEOLOGICA,
supra note 9, Pt. I-l1, Q. 95, Art. 2; see also FiNNIS, supra note 11, at 284-90 (noting that the
requirements of practical reason, as, for example, the prohibition of killing, are derived from
particular fundamental values, for example, life, and that law is either directly deduced from
principles of practical reason or from construing determinationes); GEORGE, supra note 12, at
102-11 (observing that natural law consists of three sets of principles: first, those concerning
basic human goods; second, intermediate principles directing human choice and action; and
third, fully specific moral norms). Second, according to St. Thomas, the legislator's process in
translating the transcendent principles of natural law into positive law involves
determinationes. SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 9, Pt. 1I-I, Q. 95, Art. 2.
Fundamental goods also serve as sources from which practical reason derives intermediate
principles and tertiary norms. Considering procreation as a basic natural good of life, for
example, leads to the intermediate principle that parents are the primary educators of their
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optimism about the capacity of human reason to know the natural
law and specifically to recognize marriage as an aspect of natural
law."
In contrast to the Thomist understanding of law and practical
reason, Alasdair MacIntyre distinguishes between two rival
conceptions of reason that have been hallmarks of post-
Enlightenment thought.16 The first, or "encyclopaedist," conception
understands reason as universal, impersonal, and disinterested. 17 It
focuses on "the progress of reason in which the limited conceptions of
reasoning and practices of rational enquiry generated by Socrates,
Plato, and Aristotle were enlarged by their successors, albeit with new
limitations, and then given definite and indefinitely improvable form
by Descartes."" s For the encyclopaedist, natural law theory represents
a limited conception of reason that was propagated in one variation
or another by historical figures such as Aristotle and St. Thomas
Aquinas. In the encyclopaedist's view of the progress of reason, the
notion of a natural law has long since been abrogated in favor of pure
reason, which requires that all legal claims be subjected to rigorous
critical evaluation. 9
The first modem conception of reason is evident in legal
positivism, which calls for the separation of law from moral claims.2"
Legal positivism places a high value on equality and diversity, which
children. As the second way, or determnatio, demands more creativity than the first, St.
Thomas draws an analogy to the "craftsman" who sets out to build a house. Id. See also
GEORGE, supra note 12, at 102, 108-09 (translating the Latin word artifex as "architect," and
suggesting that natural law consists of three sets of principles: basic human goods, intermediate
principles, and specific moral norms, all of which depend on practical reason). Consistent with
the Thomistic metaphor, the legislator is like the craftsman who understands the general form of
house and must implement it in a practical specification. See id. at 109 ("[Tlhe legislator
(including the judge to the extent that the judge in the jurisdiction in question exercises a
measure of law-creating power) makes the natural law effective for his community by deriving
the positive law from the natural law.").
15. See SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 9, Pt. I-I, Q. 91, Art. 2 ("It is therefore evident that
the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law."); see
also MARTIN RHONHEIMER, NATURAL LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON: A THOMIST VIEW OF MORAL
AUTONOMY 243 (Gerald Malsbary trans., 2000) ("When we realize that there is a 'plan' (a ratio)
that underlies the divine government of the world, and that this ratio gubemationis is called the
eternal law, then we can understand what it means to say that the natural law is a participation
of the eternal law in the rational creature.").
16. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY:
ENCYCLOPAEDIA, GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION 58-59 (1990).
17. Id. at 59.
18. Id. at 58.
19. See LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 2-3 (1987).
20. See BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 74-76 (3d ed. 2004).
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are expressed in legal rights independent from moral claims.21  A
claim that suggests a particular group of persons should receive
preferential treatment under the law must be based on reason. For
the legal positivists, it does not suffice to argue that the claim
represents a basic good that is prior to legal rights. For example, the
claim of natural law-that marriage consists of one man and one
woman who are united in an exclusive fidelity and a permanent
bond-would need to sustain the pressure of critical evaluation in
order for it to pass as a requirement of reason.22 Pursuant to the
positivist rubric, traditional marriage is not recognized as a basic
good prior to any individual's legal right. To the contrary, adherents
of this first modem conception of reason would tend to view
traditional marriage as one of a number of possible ways in which
human beings might elect to order living arrangements. For the
encyclopaedist, reason cannot necessarily distinguish among
traditional marriage, same-sex marriage, or couples living together
without the formal structures of marriage. As this conception of
reason requires that the law treat all human persons equally, it
follows that the positive law ought to recognize the rights of persons
to structure their personal relationships in accord with subjective
preference, as long as the subjective preference remains otherwise
lawful.
The competing modem conception, which Macntyre labels as
"genealogy," views all claims of neutrality and disinterestedness as
mere facades that mask particular interests and the drive to power.23
Attributing the competing conception to Friedrich Nietzsche,
Maclntyre describes it as "one in which reason, from the dialectic of
Socrates through the post-Kantians, both serves and disguises the
interests of the will to power by its unjustified pretensions., 24 Legal
realism, which approaches law more for its instrumental possibilities
than normative content, reflects this alternative modem conception of
reason.25 The critical legal studies movement and certain forms of
feminist theory are also consistent with this second, modem approach
21. See JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 39-41 (1996).
22. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (rejecting
marital claim of natural law and holding that the state of Massachusetts "failed to identify any
constitutionally adequate reason for denying civil marriage to same-sex couples") (emphasis
added).
23. See MACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 58.
24. Id.
25. See WILFRED E. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM: SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 48-55 (1968).
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to reason.26 According to the genealogist perspective, natural law
theory is nothing more than the creation of the powerful to maintain a
social order and status that takes advantage of those who are less
powerful. The genealogist rejects traditional marriage as an
unwarranted and unjustified limitation on the individual's autonomy.
Maclntyre points out that the modem conceptions of the
encyclopaedist and genealogist are mutually exclusive. 27  The
encyclopaedist sees reason as universal, impersonal, and
disinterested, while the genealogist views such claims as a ruse that
hides the will to power.28  Nonetheless, the conceptions agree in
conferring a unified history of reason.29 The first conception ascribes
a unified history in the progress of reason, while the competing
conception assigns a "distorting and repressing function" to the
history of reason.3"
In attributing a unified history to reason, the two modem
conceptions of reason, Maclntyre indicates, remain at odds with a
third "traditional" conception.31 This alternative holds as follows:
reason can only move towards being genuinely universal and
impersonal insofar as it is neither neutral nor disinterested, that
membership in a particular type of moral community, one from
which fundamental dissent has to be excluded, is a condition for
genuinely rational enquiry and more especially for moral and
theological enquiry.
32
While the two modem conceptions posit a unified historical
development of reason, the traditional conception points to a rupture
in the history of reason. The third conception distinguishes between
the philosophy that developed from Socrates to St. Thomas and that
of modernity, which starts with Ren6 Descartes and yields Nietzsche.
The third conception understands reason from the perspective of a
community whose members are united around a living tradition and
defined by certain canonical texts. The first two conceptions of reason
resist the idea that canonical texts contain truth from which there can
26. See ANDREW ALTMAN, CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES: A LIBERAL CRITIQUE 151-52 (1990); BiX,
supra note 20, at 222-28.
27. SeeMACINTYRE, supra note 16, at 59.
28. See id. at 58,59.
29. See id. at 58.
30. Id.
31. Seeid. at 59.
32. Id. at 59-60.
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be no fundamental dissent. The third conception of reason considers
such texts to serve as sources of wisdom in the absence of which there
cannot be enduring agreement about moral value in the community.
Cardinal Trujillo's analysis proceeds from the traditional
conception of reason. In analyzing the relationship between truth and
freedom, he suggests that contemporary culture and law manifest a
"lack of confidence in reason."3 3 In his analysis, reason is able to
demonstrate that marriage is an objective social reality that is good for
the spouses, children, and general societal stability and well-being.
This natural law position contrasts with the modem understanding of
marriage as an agreement between autonomous individuals based
upon subjective preferences. The modem view eschews
indissolubility as an impermissible restriction on the autonomy of
individuals. It leads to a redefinition of marriage by the state in a way
that is contrary to the natural law tradition. Skepticism about reason
and the consequent reduction of marriage render it difficult to offer
persuasive public policy arguments, such as Cardinal Trujillo's,
against same-sex marriage. If marriage is fundamentally based on
subjective choice, one may be hard-pressed to argue why official state
recognition must be limited to traditional marriage. This is not to
suggest that efforts to rehabilitate a certain epistemological optimism
and preserve the special legal status of traditional marriage as a
natural institution ought to be abandoned. However, the
epistemological skepticism has paved the way for judicial recognition
of same-sex marriage as a fundamental constitutional right.3  The
33. Trujillo, supra note 1, at 324.
34. The primacy of the subjective self has become a constitutive aspect of the "substantive
due process" right of privacy designed by the United States Supreme Court. In Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court struck down a state statute that criminalized the use
of contraceptives "'for the purpose of preventing conception."' Id. at 480 (quoting CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. § 53-32 (1958)). The Court appealed to the "sacredness" of marriage, describing the
statute as "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." Id. at
486. The Court's ruling in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), extended the privacy right by
protecting the distribution and use of contraceptives to non-married individuals. Id. at 454-55.
The legal reasoning underlying those two cases subsequently established the right of a woman
to have an abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Thus, though the privacy right has its
origins in the "sacred character" of marriage, the Court expanded it to include constitutional
protection for individuals to distribute and use contraception outside marriage as well as to
perform and have abortions.
In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the Court refused to further expand the
privacy right to homosexual activity because such activity was neither "'implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty,"' nor "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' Id. at 191, 192
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,
503 (1977)). By a six-to-three vote in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), however, the Court
reversed its Bowers holding. The effect of the recognition of this legal right to privacy for the
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Thomistic definition of law as an ordinance of reason suggests that
Cardinal Trujillo's position will be acceptable to those who
understand reason from the perspective of natural law. For those
who have jettisoned this conception of reason in favor of a more
modern approach, the natural law argument is likely to be
problematic.
II. MARRIAGE AND PERSONALISM
One of the primary implications of the shift to modern
conceptions of reason has been the increased importance attributed to
human subjectivity.3" During the twentieth century, the traditional
understanding of marriage as an objective social reality began to
deteriorate visibly.36  The Church responded by affirming its
traditional understanding of marriage and offering new insights in
accord with its ancient wisdom. As Cardinal Trujillo states:
"Marriage is a mutual gift, a free and mutual giving of the spouses, a
reciprocal donation of self, with the value of a total surrender-the
definition of marriage was apparent in Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), where the
Vermont Supreme Court held that a same-sex couple may not be deprived of the statutory
benefits and protections afforded to a heterosexual married couple pursuant to the Common
Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution. Id. at 867. In Goodrdge v. Dep't of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003), the highest court in Massachusetts held that failure to grant
marriage licenses to same-sex couples violated the Commonwealth's constitution.
35. This is consistent with the thought of Walter Ullmann and others, who argue that the
view of individuals with autonomous and individual rights was an Enlightenment idea, foreign
to the Middle Ages. See R.H. HELMHOLz, THE SPIRIT OF CLASSICAL CANON LAW 306, 465 (1996).
In contrast, others, including William of Ockham, suggest that the medieval canon law contains
the origins of individual rights theory. See id.
36. Statistics indicate that American society has a culture of divorce at the turn of the
twenty-first century. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
2004-2005, at 60 tbl.70 (2004), http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs04statab/vitstat.pdf.
While the data indicate a divorce rate of approximately fifty percent of all marriages, see id., the
long-term negative effects of the divorce culture on the spouses and their children have also
now been well established.
Married people in general are significantly better off in terms of physical, emotional,
financial, and spiritual well-being than divorced persons. See generally LINDA J. WAITE &
MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER,
AND BETrER OFF FINANCIALLY (Broadway Books 2001) (2000). Waite and Gallagher conclude, on
the basis of statistical surveys, that married persons and their children are generally better off
than divorced persons and their offspring both emotionally, see id. at 65-77, and financially, see
id. at 110-23. Longitudinal studies comparing children from intact families to children whose
parents are divorced have shown similar differences, and they further indicate that the
difficulties for children of divorced parents can continue for many years into adulthood. See
JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 YEAR LANDMARK
STUDY 294-316 (2000) (concluding, on the basis of a twenty-five-year longitudinal study, that
divorce has damaged spouses and children socially, psychologically, and financially).
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resultant faithfulness and stability last forever."37 This "personalist"
emphasis in the Cardinal's thought reflects a new way of thinking
about marriage that developed during the twentieth century.
When Pope Pius XI promulgated Casti Connubiiin 1930, the Holy
Father relied heavily on the seminal thought of St. Augustine.38 St.
Augustine identified the three goods of marriage as: proles (children),
fidelium (fidelity), and sacramentun (symbolic stability).39 Pius XI
accepted the traditional, Augustinian view that "[piropagation of
children .. . is . . . the primary, natural and legitimate purpose of
marriage. '  In the Augustinian view, marriage constitutes an
objective social reality because it serves both as a remedy for
concupiscence and a stable structure in which to have and raise
children. The 1917 Code of Canon Law also reflected this traditional
understanding of the primacy of procreation: "The primary end of
marriage is the procreation and education of children; the secondary
[end] is mutual support and a remedy for concupiscence."41
In 1965, at Vatican II, a development was recognized in the
Church's teaching.42 Gaudium et Spes discusses love between the
spouses and procreation as the inseparable and coequal ends of
marriage.43 This new understanding is confirmed in the 1983 Code of
Canon Law:
The matrimonial covenant, by which a man and a woman establish
between themselves a partnership of the whole of life and which is
ordered by its nature to the good of the spouses and the procreation
37. Trujillo, supra note 1, at 302.
38. See generally Cash Connubii, supra note 4, 99 77-117.
39. See SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE GOOD OF MARRIAGE, reprinted in ST. AUGUSTINE ON
MARRIAGE AND SEXUALITY, 1 SELECTIONS FROM THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH 42, 42-61 (Elizabeth
A. Clark ed., 1996) [hereinafter THE GOOD OF MARRIAGE].
40. SAINT AUGUSTINE, ADULTEROUS MARRIAGES, BOOK TWO: A REPLY TO FURTHER
OBJECTIONS FROM POLLENTIUS, reprinted in MARRIAGE AND VIRGINITY, PT. 1, VOL. 9 THE WORKS
OF SAINT AUGUSTINE: A TRANSLATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 166, 175 (Ray Kearney trans.,
David G. Hunter & John E. Rotelle, O.S.A. eds., 1999); see also Casi Connubii, supra note 4,
80.
41. 1917 CODE c.1013, § 1, reprinted in THE 1917 OR PIO-BENEDICTINE CODE OF CANON LAW
352 (Edward N. Peters, curator, Ignatius Press 2001) (1918).
42. The development of Catholic doctrine presents a historical and theologically complex
question. For a classical description, see JOHN HENRY CARDINAL NEWMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE (Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 6th ed. 1989) (1878).
43. See Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes [Pastoral Constitution on the Church in
the Modem World] 1 48 (1965), reprinted in THE SIXTEEN DOCUMENTS OF VATICAN 11513,561-63
(Nat'l Catholic Welfare Conference trans., St. Paul ed. 1967).
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and education of offspring, has been raised by Christ the Lord to the
dignity of a sacrament between the baptized.44
As with Gaudium et Spes, the goods of procreation and the love
between the spouses are treated as inseparable, and one is not
prioritized over the other.
The development remains consistent with several prominent
strains of St. Augustine's thoughts on marriage. St. Augustine wrote
as a bishop, and much of his thought on marriage was intended as an
answer to pastoral problems. Early in his episcopate, one of these
pastoral answers arose in response to an asceticism movement with
Manichean overtones in the Church.45 During the final decade of the
fourth century, St. Jerome entered into a debate with a fellow
Christian, Jovinian, over the nature of marriage.46 While Jovinian
argued that marriage was of equal status to chastity, St. Jerome
thought that marriage was an inferior way of life as compared to
chastity.47 St. Jerome urged married women to live chaste lives even
while they continued to be married.' Although he vigorously denied
the charge, St. Jerome advanced a position that bordered on
Manicheanism, which viewed the human body and sexual
reproduction in a negative light.49 St. Augustine attempted to steer a
middle course in the debate between St. Jerome and Jovinian.-° In The
Good of Marriage, St. Augustine acknowledged the superiority of
chastity, but wrote about the goodness of marriage.51 "[T]he marriage
of male and female is something good," St. Augustine explained, not
"solely because of the procreation of children, but also because of the
natural companionship between the two sexes."52  Although St.
Augustine thought that procreation was the primary good, he also
recognized the companionship of the spouses as a good of marriage.
In his later writing, St. Augustine confronted the Pelagian denial
of original sin.53 In Book 14 of The City of God, St. Augustine
44. 1983 CODE c.1055, § 1, reprinted in NEW COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW
1240 (ohn P. Beal et al. eds., Paulist Press 2000) (1998).
45. See THE GOOD OF MARRIAGE, supra note 39, at 42-61.
46. Id. at 42.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.; THEODORE MACKIN, THE MARITAL SACRAMENT 177-86 (1989).
50. See THE GOOD OF MARRIAGE, supra note 39, at 43.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 45.
53. A recently discovered letter of St. Augustine suggests that he thought that even if the
Fall had not occurred, there may have been sinless sexual desire in Eden. See SAINT AUGUSTINE,
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advanced a view that was directly at odds with the opinion of St.
Jerome and other patristic writers.' If original sin had not been
committed, St. Augustine speculated, Adam and Eve would still have
engaged in sexual intercourse in the Garden of Paradise.55 St.
Augustine stated: "The man, then, would have sown the seed, and the
woman received it, as need required, the generative organs being
moved by the will, not excited by lust."56 St. Augustine thought that
prior to the original sin, what is "now moved in his body only by lust
should have been moved only at will."57 Referring to Adam and Eve,
the first married couple, he wrote:
But that blessing upon marriage, which encouraged them to increase
and multiply and replenish the earth, though it continued even after
they had sinned, was yet given before they sinned, in order that the
procreation of children might be recognised as part of the glory of
marriage, and not of the punishment of sin.58
St. Augustine thought that sexual intercourse was a good created by
God that had become disordered as a result of original sin.59
The Augustinian tradition on the goodness of sexuality and
marriage is evident in the personalist thought of Karol Wojtyla (Pope
John Paul II). Wojtyla was one of a number of twentieth-century
Catholic thinkers who adopted a methodological turn to the human
subject.6" Specifically, Wojtyla's thought exemplifies an attempt to
EPISTLE 6, reprinted in ST. AUGUSTINE ON MARRIAGE AND SEXUALITY, supra note 39, at 99, 99-105.
See also infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
54. SAINT AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD, Bk. XIV, (Marcus Dods trans., 1993).
55. See id. ch. 24.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. ch. 21.
59. The Thomist position differed from the Augustinian view. The fourth article of
question 42 of the supplement to the Summa Theologica states: "There was matrimony in
Paradise, and yet there was no carnal intercourse." SUMMA THEOLOGICA, supra note 9, Supp., Q.
42, Art. 4. The same article states that "matrimony is holier without carnal intercourse." Id.
60. For examples of works by some of these twentieth-century Catholic thinkers, see YVES
M.J. CONGAR, 2 I BELIEVE IN THE HOLY SPIRIT 11 (David Smith trans., 1983); HENRI DE LUBAC,
CATHOLICISM: CHRIST AND THE COMMON DESTINY OF MAN 326 (L. Sheppard & E. Englund trans.,
1988); KARL RAHNER, FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE IDEA OF
CHRISTIANITY 24-115 (William V. Dych trans., The Seabury Press 1978) (1976); HANS URS VON
BALTHASAR, A THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 43-102 (1967). This is not to suggest that these
twentieth-century theologians were consciously working in concert as part of a larger systematic
project. To be sure, they were writing from diverse perspectives, and there are significant
differences in their thought. Some of the theological contributors to the endeavor found that
their work was met with censure from ecclesiastical authority. A shift transpired at the Second
Vatican Council (1963-65), when official documents of the Ecumenical Council incorporated the
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address modem subjectivity even as it remains faithful to the Catholic
tradition.6 This approach paved the way for the development in the
Church's teaching on marriage that was recognized at Vatican II.
First, Wojtyla affirmed the goodness of human sexuality. In Love and
Responsibility, he wrote that "[n]either sensuality nor even
concupiscence is a sin in itself, since only that which derives from the
will can be a sin-only an act of a conscious and voluntary nature
(voluntarium)."62  While St. Augustine saw concupiscence as a
consequence of original sin, Wojtyla emphasized that "a sensual
reaction, or the 'stirring of' carnal desire which results from it, and
which occurs irrespectively and independently of the will, cannot in
themselves be sins. ,63
Second, Wojtyla drew a distinction between individualism and
personalism.6' According to Wojtyla, "[i]ndividualism sees in the
individual the supreme and fundamental good .... ,,6 While
individualism denotes that the human person acts primarily to advance
self-interest, personalism refers to the constitution of the human person
through acting in solidarity with others. Personalism posits the human
person as created not for self-interest but for self-transcendence.66
Third, Wojtyla applied his personalist analysis to sexuality and
marriage. The analysis starts with an appreciation of the value of the
human person as "its own master" endowed with free will.67 Wojtyla
insisted that sexuality involves more than sensual and emotional
phenomena. He wrote:
The sensual and emotional experiences which are so vividly present
in the consciousness form only the outward expression and also the
turn to the human subject. See 1 HISTORY OF VATICAN 1 72-132 (Giuseppe Alberigo & Joseph A.
Komanchak eds., 1995); Giacomo Martina, The Historical Context in Wich the Idea of a New
Ecumenical Council Was Born, in 1 VATICAN II: ASSESSMENT AND PERSPECTIVES: TwENTY-FIVE
YEARS AFTER (1962-1987) 3-73 (Ren6 Latourelle, S.J. ed., 1988).
61. See Robert F. Harvanek, The Philosophical Foundations of the Thought ofJohn Paul II
in THE THOUGHT OF JOHN PAUL II: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS AND STUDIES 1-21 (John M.
McDermott, S.J. ed., 1993) (describing the phenomenological and Thomistic philosophical strains
in the thought of Wojtyla).
62. See WOJTYLA, supra note 5, at 161.
63. Id.
64. See 10 KAROL WOTrYLA [POPE JOHN PAUL II], ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA [THE ACTING
PERSON] 264-67, 272-73, (Andrzej Potocki trans., Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka ed., D. Reidel Publ'g
Co. 1979) (1969) (describing the distinction between individualism and personalism).
65. Id. at 273.
66. See generally EMMANUEL MOUNIER, PERSONALISM at xv-xxviii (Univ. of Notre Dame
Press, paperback ed. 1970) (1950) (describing the origins and characteristics of modern
personalist thought).
67. WOJTYLA, supra note 5, at 125.
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outward gauge of what is happening, or most certainly should be
happening, deep inside the persons involved. Self-giving can have
its full value only when it involves and is the work of the will. For it
is free will that makes the person its own master (sui juris), an
inalienable and untransferable "some-one" (alteri
incommunicabih's). Betrothed love, the love that is the gift of self,
commits the will in a particularly profound way. As we know
already, it means disposing of one's whole self, in the language of
the Gospels, "giving one's soul." 68
This paradoxical aspect of betrothed love flows from the "work of the
will," in which the mutual love of the spouses entices acts of self-
sacrifice for each other and then for the family as a whole.69 Wojtyla
contrasts this profound "love that is a gift of self" with "the
superficial view of sex."7" The superficial view involves "mutual
sexual exploitation" in which the "woman[] surrender[s] ... her body
to a man."71 Instead, the profound love of the spouses in marriage
demands the reciprocity of mutual surrender of both persons.72 The
experience of marital love, according to Wojtyla:
forcibly detaches the person, so to speak, from this natural
inviolability and inalienability. It makes the person want to do just
that-surrender itself to another, to the one it loves. The person no
longer wishes to be its own exclusive property, but instead to
become the property of that other. This means the renunciation of its
autonomy and its inalienability. Love proceeds by way of this
renunciation, guided by the profound conviction that it does not
diminish and impoverish, but quite the contrary, enlarges and
enriches the existence of the person.73
Wojtyla's personalism reflects a certain understanding of the human
person, or "anthropology." The anthropology holds that the human
person has the capacity for reason, which reveals the truth about
sexuality and marriage and the will to act in accord with this truth.
According to this anthropological vision, the permanent and exclusive
commitment of marriage affords the human person the opportunity for
self-transcendence in which the person is not diminished but increased.
68. Id. at 126.
69. See id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 125-26.
73. Id.
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Cardinal Trujillo shares this anthropological vision.74 Even as he
affirms marriage as an objective social reality that justifies special
treatment under the law, Cardinal Trujillo relies upon personalist
language to describe marriage. The love between spouses, he writes, "is
a very special form of personal friendship."75 Cardinal Trujillo's analysis
reflects the Church's attempt to respond to the increasing importance of
human subjectivity in culture and law. At the mid-point of the twentieth
century, this response was evident in the personalism of Catholic
thinkers such as Wojtyla. When it focused on the good of spousal love as
equal to procreation, Vatican II accepted this personalist anthropology as
an aspect of the Church's teaching on marriage. While the new focus
may be described as a development in the Church's teaching, its roots
are detectable in the tradition of the Church and are not entirely
inconsistent with the thought of St. Augustine. Cardinal Trujillo calls for
legal protection of marriage that corresponds to the personalist
anthropological vision.
CONCLUSION
In the face of the skepticism of modem, epistemological
assumptions, Cardinal Trujillo's analysis of marriage and family offers a
more optimistic assessment of the possibilities for human reason. He
maintains that practical reason has the capacity to recognize marriage as
a basic human good that merits preferential treatment in positive law.
His insistence that traditional marriage constitutes an objective social
reality offers an antidote to a culture and law in which marriage is
increasingly defined by subjectivity. It is likely that Cardinal Trujillo's
epistemological assumptions will not be universally accepted in legal
systems that reject natural law in favor of the increased subjectivity
afforded by legal positivism. The personalist perspective on marriage
represents an attempt to highlight the subjective experience of the love
within marriage and the family even as it upholds the Augustinian view
of marriage as an objective social reality. It is difficult to predict whether
or not the Church's traditional teaching, with its twentieth-century
development, might ultimately correct the legal situation in which
traditional marriage is increasingly seen as an artifact. In the face of the
family's disintegration and the social ills associated with it, Cardinal
Trujillo's analysis offers hope for a future rooted in a living tradition.
74. See Trujillo, supra note 1, at 336.
75. Id. at 314.
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